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Introduction 
The struggle to define Islam’s destiny has begun. Islam as a religion is part of more than a 
billion people’s lives in every nation of the world. Islamic history, spanning fourteen centuries, 
has given the world a multiplicity of cultures, languages, and peoples contributing to every 
major human endeavor from philosophy to anatomy. However, Islam is undergoing a major 
revolution in which Muslims must ask themselves what part of their multifaceted history will 
define the future. One element what makes modern Muslims distinctly Islamic is an adherence 
to Islamic law (or the Shari’ah).(1) 
Islamic law, unlike other legal modus operandi (such as the common law or the civil code) is 
not confined to the present world. Instead, the Shari’ah focuses on how present world actions 
will affect their people’s afterlife. The Prophet’s message, the Qur’an, is not only a religious 
text, but to Muslims, the very Word of God. Once the Word was reveled to humanity, it was 
difficult for Muslims to ignore both a text that detailed God’s expectations and the exemplary 
life of the Prophet. Muslims, in attempting to emulate the Prophet and continue the legal 
legacy imparted by the Qur’an however, were thwarted by a directionless approach. 
Nevertheless, the expanse of Muslim populations reached new heights and the law 
concomitantly stretched in many directions. As the law was left further to the trust of 
scholars, division ensued as to what constituted a proper course of conduct, leading to a legal 
standstill and leaving behind the rationality of everyday people. By the time, the Shari’ah 
began to ossify; the political leadership began to fade. The task of creating a complete legal 
legacy and a religious doctrine was difficult, if not impossible, especially in the modern world. 
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European attempts to extricate the Shari’ah were replaced by a re-emphasis on religious 
law. As Islamic nation-states began to form, they also carried with them a dormant, yet 
revered Shari’ah. Today, however, social and political institutions have failed Muslims and 
many are living in the midst of constant war, and repression while being ignored or despised 
by the more wealthy and alien West. Muslims, now, as during the life of the Prophet, see 
religion, as an integral part of their lives. The common, yet inadequate, answer has been to 
look beyond present failures for a religious solution. For Revivalists (rather than entitling 
them disingenuously “fundamentalists”), recapturing Islam’s past glory requires that 
followers of the Faith cast away present concerns for a strict adherence to the example set by 
the life of the Prophet and the Qur’an, i.e., the reinstitution of the Shari’ah. For Reformists, the 
future offers an opportunity for followers to re-examine the past and bring forth Islam’s most 
innovative ideas as a blueprint for the future. The present malaise of social and political 
waywardness is a Revivalist justification for Muslims returning to their fundamental roots as 
the basis for life. In addition, Revivalists narrowly look to Islam’s bellicose past as an 
indication that only purely Islamic solutions will wrest Muslims from their problems and not 
secular Western solutions. 
Challenging the notion that religious solutions imparted by humans could ever create a 
sustaining Islamic society, Reformists see the blind adherence to Shari’ah as the antithesis to 
progress. Reformists point to examples of where the Qur’an has been taken out of context and 
how present political regimes that have instituted the Shari’ah have only produced more 
misery. The Shari’ah stands as a façade to growing unrest. Reformists see the post-Cold War 
era as an opportunity to reform the Shari’ah so that it can be responsive to the needs of 
everyday people. 
The post-Cold War world has produced what many believe is a stasis in the international 
regime. Revivalists instead have resorted to a paranoid mentality charging that Muslims 
should not be engaged in the international arena for to do so would continue the capitulation 
of Islamic standards to secular Westernized ideas. Reformists counter that such a suspicious 
mentality should be dismissed in favor of moderation and understanding based on the law 
created by the equity of nations. 
Revivalists, Reformists, and the West alike have noticed the disparity between the Shari’ah 
and modern international legal standards of women’s rights especially under the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and her progeny. 
Understanding the Reformist arguments for and the Revivalist arguments against the 
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convention’s aim helps illustrate what impact the Reformist/Revivalist debate in the 
international arena will have on the daily lives of Muslim peoples. The present international 
legal regime, operating on an egalitarian system among states, offers a moderating 
reformulation of the Shari’ah by imparting moderate Islamic solutions that also alter the 
political and social face of Islamic states and helping Muslims and non-Muslims end the 
mentality of mistrust and ignorance. 
 
History 
The religion of Islam (lit. “surrendering to the will of God”) was founded in Mecca, Arabia 
by Muhammad.(2) At about 610 CE, Muhammad had a vision of the angel Gabriel announcing 
his role as the Prophet of God.(3) This marked the beginning of his career as messenger (or 
apostle) (rasul), of God. Muhammad, declared successor to the lineage of Prophets, was to 
receive God’s last message to humanity.(4) From this time, at frequent intervals until his 
death, he received revelations directly from God. Sometimes Muhammad and his followers 
kept these in memory, and sometimes they were written down. Later, (by the year 650) they 
were collected and written in the Qur’an, in a form that has endured. Muslims believe the 
Qur’an is a divine revelation, written in the words of God Himself. By all accounts, Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike dually appreciate the Qur’an’s distinct style: “The style of expression 
underlying the Qur’an is a curious blend of poetic rhymed prose and a lyrical flow.” (5) 
According to Muslim tradition, the Qur’an was revealed to Muhammad in separate pieces 
over some twenty years. On such occasions, Muhammad, it is said, was in a kind of trance or 
ecstasy, during which the archangel Gabriel brought the revelations to him. On his return to 
normal consciousness, he recited the words of revelation to those present. There are many 
traditions about the occasions on which a certain sura (chapter) or part of a sura was 
revealed. Thus, the revelation of the Qur’an is connected with events in the life of the Prophet. 
Even the traditional version of the Qur’an itself classifies the suras as Meccan or Medinan. 
What no perusal of the Qur’an fails to yield is that divine morality is heavily intertwined with 
legality. Clearly any verse of the Qur’an, no matter its designation, earns an autonomic 
reverence that borders on idolatry. What remains for the legal mind, is that the Qur’an is 
distinct among legal and religious texts: joining legality with the infallible word of God could 
only manufacture weak human emulations aiming to follow the prescribed Law. 
Although Muhammad’s preaching was religious, there was implicit in it a critique of 
idolatrous tribes of Mecca. Islam preached an extreme monotheism and drew extreme 
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hostility from many in the Meccan community. Consequently, the Prophet, in the midst of 
increasing tensions and a failed assassination attempt, was forced to leave Mecca, and 
eventually arrived in the distant city of Yathrib whose people invited him to be their leader. 
Like Yathrib’s name change to Medinat al Nabi (the City of the Prophet) or Medina in honor of 
their new ruler and legislator, so too had the Islamic faith changed character from that of a 
religion to a pronounced religious society. The Prophet Muhammad and his followers left 
Mecca and reached Medina safely on September 24, 622.(6) This, the celebrated hijrah, marks 
the beginning of the Islamic calendar. Interestingly, the Muslim calendar does not center on 
the birth of Muhammad or a miraculous event, but rather on the establishment of 
the umma (the nation of believers). For Islam, the establishment of a religion coincided with 
the creation of a nationality and since its national inception, Islam sought to ensure the 
validity of law within a moral society. During the Prophet Muhammad’s tenure in Medina, an 
informal orthopraxy and a relatively simple belief system were converted into a full-fledged 
theocracy. The Prophet Muhammad introduced a revolution: 
Like other prophets before him, Muhammad’s message was both feared and shunned by 
the powerful and entrenched interests of the economic and political elite, who represented 
the social and economic inequities of society which the Prophet censured. His teachings 
included outright condemnation of false contracts, usury, the neglect and exploitation of 
orphans and widows, the suppression of the rights of the poor, and the neglect of the 
downtrodden by the rich. Muhammad had come to shake up the status quo in his world, and 
the radical nature of his message was clear.(7) 
Medina was a relatively cosmopolitan society for Arabia: a considerable contingent of 
immigrant Muslims from Mecca, a vast population of newly converted followers in Medina, 
and in their midst, a considerable Jewish population who early on saw Muhammad as the 
promised Messiah. Although, the Jews rejected Muhammad as their religious leader, they 
accepted him as the ordained political leader of the city. As the Qur’an grew in size and 
Muhammad’s rule strengthened, war broke out when neighboring Mecca saw the Prophet’s 
rising power as a threat. Ever since the hijrah, Muhammad had been forming alliances with 
nomadic tribes and non-aggression pacts like the Treaty Hudaybiya, but, when he was strong 
enough to offer protection, he made it a condition of alliance that the tribe should become 
Muslim. Soon, however, Muhammad consolidated his power, recaptured Mecca without 
bloodshed, and granted universal amnesty in the name of Islam. A few years later, the Prophet 
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declared the religion “complete” and the Qur’an finished.(8) The Prophet Muhammad died in 
Medina in 632 CE.(9) 
 
The Evolution of the Shari’ah 
In its traditional form, the Shari’ah differs from Western systems of law in two principal 
respects. In the first place, the scope of the Shari’ah is much wider, since it regulates 
humanity’s relationship not only with one’s neighbors and with the state, which is the limit of 
most other legal systems, but also with one’s God and one’s own conscience.(10) Ritual 
practices, such as the daily prayers, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage, are an integral part of 
Shari’ah law and usually occupy the first chapters in the legal manuals. The Shari’ah is also 
concerned as much with ethical standards as with legal rules, indicating not only what man is 
entitled or bound to do in law, but also what one should, in conscience, to do or refrain from 
doing. The Shari’ah is not merely a system of law, but a comprehensive code of behavior that 
embraces both private and public activities. 
The second major distinction between the Shari’ah and Western legal systems is the result 
of the Islamic concept of law, as the expression of the Divine Will. With the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad in 632, communication of the divine will to man ceased so that the terms 
of the divine revelation were henceforth fixed and immutable. When, therefore, the process of 
interpretation and expansion of this source material was held to be complete with the 
crystallization of the doctrine in the medieval legal manuals, Shari’ah law became a rigid and 
static system. Unlike secular legal systems that grow out of society and change with the 
changing circumstances of society, the Shari’ah was imposed upon society from above. In 
Islamic jurisprudence it is not society that moulds and fashions the law, but the law that 
precedes and controls society. 
For the first Muslim community established under the leadership of the Prophet at Medina 
after the hijrah, the Qur’anic revelations laid down basic standards of conduct. Most of the 
jurisprudence centered on easily referenced positions within the Qur’an including matters of 
taxes, property, and inheritance.(11) Nevertheless, the Qur’an is in no sense a comprehensive 
legal code. No more than 80 verses deal with strictly legal matters; while these verses cover a 
wide variety of topics and introduce many novel rules, their general effect is simply to modify 
the existing Arabian customary law in certain important particulars.(12) During his lifetime, 
the Prophet Muhammad, acting as the supreme judge of the community, resolved legal 
problems as they arose by interpreting and expanding the general provisions of the Qur’an. 
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For Muslims, although Muhammad did not ascribe to himself any attributes of the Deity, he 
was renowned not only as God’s messenger of His final message, he also was the vicegerent of 
God, a father, a husband: a human par excellence. The Prophet’s exemplary standing in the 
Muslim cosmological view made the Prophet’s practices (sunna) ideal and his actions helped 
to expound the Qur’an beyond mere words. To obey the Prophet Muhammad was by its very 
definition to obey God.(13) 
Since direct revelation from God ceased, a caliph (the Prophet’s political successor) has no 
legitimate claim or right of continuing the religious legacy of the Qur’an. Following 
Muhammad’s ministry, a caliph’s attempts to maintain order within the 
religious state, revolved around a clumsy legal adherence to religious rules.(14) At the end of 
the day, this attempt to create a full-fledged legal system proved contrary to Islamic 
principles. Thus, early religious law was left to the ad hoc machinations of the Caliphs.(15) 
After the death of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, (the Prophet’s immediate successors) Qur’anic 
laws of the Medinian period had become lost with the expanding horizons of activity. 
One reaction to the incongruity of religious practice arose in the early 8th century when 
pious scholars, grouped together in loose, fraternities, formally known as the schools of law, 
began to debate whether legal practice was properly implementing the religious ethic of 
Islam. Caliphs, who came to power in the mid-8th century pledging to build a true Islamic 
state and society, zealously sponsored the jurist (faqih) activities within early Schools of 
Law. Believing that the qadis (judges) were failing in their duty to integrate and implement 
the spirit of Qur’an inspired increased discontent. As the discontent grew, so did the number 
of schools of law within the major cities throughout the Islamic world. Imams (religious 
leaders), not popular movements, inspired increased legal proliferation. The four major 
surviving schools, the Shafi’i, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali were subsequently named after the 
Imams who founded them. 
Congruently, decades after the Prophet’s death, legal constructions not delegated by the 
Qur’an were codified by arguably the greatest Islamic legal theorist, Muhammad Ibn Idris al-
Shafi’i (d. 820).(16) To the minor detriment of other thinkers, Shafi’i’s doctrines have been the 
principle focus of this study only for purposes of possessing, what many scholars argue, is the 
mean of Islam’s theological and legal underpinnings. Ironically, al-Shafi’i, early on had the 
support neither of the self-purported rationalists or the strict-constructionist conservatives, 
but in time, both sides accepted his theological positions. Today much his attribution to the 
modern systemic has been extinguished by time.(17) 
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During Islam’s rise, a group of rationalists known as the Mu’tazilites, known for their 
extreme rationalization, argued that belief principles should be grounded in the cogent 
thoughts of human beings. Believers, guided by a philosophical and religious study of the 
Qur’an were induced to a proper course of action.(18) Soon, however, because their 
theological stance invited troubling questions about the wisdom of Islamic doctrine the 
mainstream orthodoxy rejected the Mu’tazilites. The Mu’tazilites wanted to avoid everything 
that might compromise or encroach upon the oneness of God, denied the doctrine that the 
Qur’an was uncreated and eternal, because this would mean that something else besides the 
God of eternity would exist eternally and thus create an eternal and irreconcilable “dualism.” 
Consequently, they asserted that God created the Qur’an. Orthodox adherents of Islam, 
however, rejected this doctrine and consequently began to remove the role of human 
rationality within the law and the subsequent decline of democratic principles.(19) 
Al Shafi’i aimed to eliminate legal and religious schisms by producing a uniform theory of 
how to derive authorized principles from the prolixity of sacred advice.(20) Al Shafi’i’s 
fundamental teaching was that true knowledge of the Shari’ah could be attained through a 
derivation of divine revelation found either in the Qur’an and/or in the divinely inspired 
traditions through authenticated reports of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith). The corpus of 
the legal authority, i.e., Qur’an and compilations of the hadith were known collectively 
as Ilm.(21) Human reason played only a limited role by being confined to the process of 
analogical deduction, or qiyas--problems not specifically answered by the divine revelation 
were to be solved by applying the principles upon which the Qur’an had regulated closely 
parallel cases. (22) As a result, even if there was human inclusion in the production of legal 
theory, it was limited not only to the literate, but to also a cadre of religious scholars. A full-
fledged legislative role soon evaporated in the elite halls of eclectic scholarship. 
Al Shafi’i’s insistence upon the importance of the sunna as a source of law produced a great 
activity in the collection and classification of hadith, particularly among his own supporters, 
who formed the Shafi’i School, and the followers of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855) who formed 
the Hanbali School.(23) Muslim scholarship maintained that the classical compilations 
of hadith--especially those of Bukhari (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875)(24) --constituted an 
authentic record of the Prophet’s precedents. Empiricists today, however, argue that a 
considerable portion of the sunna is fictitiously ascribed to the Prophet by jurists during the 
formulation of the various schools in order to give their own legal doctrine greater 
validity.(25) Steady reformation of the law came in the form of scholars and jurists imposing 
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binding advisory opinions upon legal practices in the light of Qur’anic principles and then on 
this basis, adopt, modify, or reject the practice as part of their grand scheme of the law. 
Of the early Schools of Law, the two most important were the Malikis in Medina and the 
Hanafis in Kufa, named after the Principled Thinkers, Malik ibn Anas and Abu Hanifah, 
respectively. Inevitably the Maliki and Hanafi doctrines, as they were being recorded in the 
first compendiums of law, differed considerably from each other, not only because free juristic 
speculation was bound to produce varying results but also because the thought of the scholars 
was conditioned by their different social environments.(26) A deep conflict of juristic 
principle emerged within the schools between those who maintained that outside the terms of 
the Qur’an scholars were free to use their reason (ra’y) to ascertain the law and those who 
insisted that the only valid source of law outside the Qur’an lay in the precedents set by the 
Prophet himself.(27) 
Al Shafi’i’s thesis formed the basis of the classical theory of the science of jurisprudence 
(usul al-fiqh), which was crystallized in the early 10th century.(28) Juristic “effort” to 
comprehend the terms of the Shari’ah is known as ijtihad, and legal theory first defines the 
course that ijtihad must follow. A jurist (who was both legislator and judge) had to have the 
regulation of law divinely correct. The question constantly posed to an early Shari’ah jurist 
was, “[H]ow can one know that a particular decision in a world of confusion is right, is what 
God wills?”(29) To seek the answer to a legal problem, the jurist must first consult the Qur’an 
and the sunna. Failing any specific solution in this divine revelation he must then cautiously 
employ a learned analogy (qiyas) or certain subsidiary principles of reasoning. The legal 
theory then evaluates the results of ijtihad based on the criterion of ijma’ (consensus). As an 
attempt to define the law, theijtihad of individual scholars could result only in a tentative 
conclusion termed zann (“conjecture”), but where a conclusion became the subject 
of unanimous agreement by the qualified scholars, it became a certain (yaqin) and infallible 
expression of God’s law.(30) 
Two major effects flowed from the classical doctrine of ijma’. First, it served as a permissive 
principle to admit varying opinions as equal attempts to define the Shari’ah. Second, it 
operated as a restrictive principle to ratify the status quo. However, once the ijma’ had cast an 
umbrella authority not only over those points that were the subject of a consensus but also 
over existing variant opinions, propounding any other views contradicting the 
infallible ijma’ was tantamount to heresy.(31) Hallaq states the essence behind this intensity 
to devise a proper ruling: 
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When the texts explicitly state the ruling of a case, then there should be no room for doubt 
whether or not it is God’s intention. However, when the texts provide only indications and 
signs, the jurist then must attempt to find out the divine intention, although there is no 
guarantee that the ruling he reaches will be identical with what is lodged in God’s mind.(32) 
(emphasis added) 
Ijma’ set the final seal of rigidity upon the doctrine, and from the 10th century onward 
independent juristic speculation ceased. In the Arabic expression, “the door of ijtihad was 
closed,” and henceforth jurists were muqallids, or imitators, bound by the doctrine 
of taqlid (“clothing with authority” i.e., unquestioned acceptance) to follow the doctrine as it 
was recorded in the authoritative legal manuals (ilm). The process of developing further 
jurisprudential inroads ended.(33) 
By the 13th century, Islamic empires were in disarray.(34) Soon the corpus of law stilled. 
The explication of law only continued under some Muslim societies. By the era of the modern 
state and the rise of European powers, much time intervened since the full-fledged explication 
of law. Some schools of law like the Maliki School survived in Northern Africa by disposing 
their formal strict constructive approach. However, for example such reforms did not affect 
the popular, but rigid Hanbali School of Law. 
[The Maliki School] took considerable notice of conditions prevailing in fact, not by 
changing the ideal doctrine of the law in any respect, but by recognizing that actual conditions 
did not allow the strict theory to be translated into practice, and that it was better to control 
the practice as much as possible than to abandon it completely.(35) 
Even though the Schools of Law recognized their own canons of works and attributed much 
of their learning to their Imams, reformists were always present through the last stages of 
legal development in the fourteenth century. Thus, an informal survey of Islamic law 
concludes that legitimating human actors trying to discern God’s reason or “finding” Divine 
morality led to a legal exhaustion which still affects the present state of law and society. 
  
The Revivalist Argument for Reinstitution of Islamic Law 
In the modern era, the Islamic world faces serious economic and social problems. Many 
attribute the turmoil to the lax, non-existent application or a rigid application of the Shari’ah. 
Today, the economic and social stagnation of the Islamic world has attracted the attention of a 
powerful revivalist movement aimed at reinstituting what is deemed Islamic “fundamentals.” 
The Cold War subdued fanatical interests by forcing Islamic states to pick their side. 
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Interestingly, many Islamic states ideologically split between the two great political and social 
forces. For some, it promoted a measured adherence to western liberal notions of rights and 
democracy. After the Cold War, a thorough self-evaluation confirmed Revivalist suspicions 
that all things are not well within Islam: the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict involving Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, constant (nuclear) rumblings 
between India and Pakistan, conflict between Chechnya/Dagestan and Russia, civil war in 
Algeria, Muslim-Christian violence in Nigeria and Sudan, Sunni-Shi’a conflicts in Pakistan, 
Bosnia, Kosovo and the Serbia, Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist bombings, Iraqi, Turkish and 
Iranian persecution of the Kurds, violence in the Xinjiang province of China all are illustrative 
of Islam’s many problems. In essence, “Islamic history is largely the history of a people at 
war.”(36) According to the most zealous Revivalist, even the existence of the mighty 
petrodollar in some Muslim states constitutes a capitulation by influential states to continue 
the trend of Islamic subservience to Western nations in the most essential matters. Revivalists 
constantly remind the rest of the world that the present state of turmoil in the Middle East, 
intensified by the Gulf War, is yet another example of Western nations (especially the United 
States) imposing their religious and strategic interests in the land of Islam. 
Indeed, what Arabs find at home is economic lethargy and social stagnation. The energy, 
the daring entrepreneurial experience that suddenly appeared in the Pacific societies remains 
long absent in the Middle East. The Arab world seems weighed down by the pessimism over 
its future, if not outright despair. Unfortunately, the rest of the world seems indifferent to this 
condition. The headlines in the international press that deal with the Middle East point 
instead to the violence and terrorism that are made out to be that region’s product.(37) 
Muslim-Christian superpower rivalries, leading to the infamous Crusades, have matured 
into present stereotypes of Islam and Muslims. As William Muir pointed out, in his position at 
the University of Edinburgh in 1897, Islam is “the only undisguised and formidable antagonist 
of Christianity.” He continues by arguing that Muslim’s [pre-Crusades] view of Europe, 
although more sedately, resonates a similar measure of antagonism: 
As regards the people of the northern quadrant. [T]he warm humor is lacking among them; 
their bodies are large, their natures gross, their manners harsh, their understanding dull, and 
their tongues heavy. [T]heir religious beliefs lack solidity, and this is because of the nature of 
cold and the lack of warmth. The farther they are to the north the more stupid, gross, and 
brutish they are. These qualities increase in them as they go further northward.(38) 
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Anti-Muslim sentiment continued with the rise and fall of European empires that carved 
much of the Islamic world among territories that knew nothing of previous political 
boundaries nor enmities that presently exist. In spite of the desire to reduce ingrained 
religious hostility, it is clear that militant Islam has persuaded Muslims that basic “Western” 
notions of democracy and liberalism are alien to their faith. Instead, many of these militants 
have instead advocated an exclusionary legal doctrine to further separate themselves from 
the West. 
According to scholars, Revivalist misgivings about the West will likely continue. In The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, Harvard Professor Samuel 
Huntington argues that the aberration of the Cold War has left the world in disarray. The shift 
to a multipolar world has only increased tensions between the West and her sister 
civilizations. Huntington continues by arguing that of the seven major civilizations, the Islamic 
and Western civilizations are being propelled toward a major global war.(39) For Huntington 
and others well immersed in the Cold War experience, many believe that Islam remains the 
last great ideological contestant to the West and liberal democracy. Contiguously, the West 
has looked at Islam with skepticism, fear, and misunderstanding. For most non-Muslims, 
Islam is an indistinct religion of white tunics, much kneeling, and the fanatic violence of 
bloodthirsty savages. Americans, especially, have little understanding for the challenge that 
Muslims face where fledging democracies are thwarted by military subversion and where 
unlike the rest of the globe, the last decade of economic expansion has passed by many 
Muslim states. Illustrating fully this mistrust, Americans ask themselves questions such as, 
“[W]hy are we so hated there?” or “[T]hose people must be crazy!” and finally, “[W]hat are 
they fighting over now?” (40) At the same time, many Islamic countries view the United States 
and Europe as having greater power than they over their daily lives.(41) 
Hence, the growing quantum of cultural and economic problems has only helped inflame 
Islamic revivalist movement. Present social and ideological problems signal an urgent need by 
Muslims, whether Reformist or Revivalist, to set their own house in order. John L. Esposito, 
Professor of Religion and International Affairs and Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian 
Understanding at Georgetown, points out that early Islamic revivalists, like the early Muslims 
of the formulative era of the Schools of Law, aimed at improving social conditions: 
This manifestation of Islam in politics comes from a broader phenomenon: in many parts of 
the Muslim world, there has been a religious resurgence, both in private and in public life. 
People are more concerned about Islamic dress, values, and fasting during Ramadan. But what 
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has caught our attention is the extent to which Islam has exploded, as it were, in terms of 
political and social activism.(42) 
Islam has always sought a level of legitimacy between rulers and the ruled, but Revivalists 
state further that little attention has been paid to the role of God. In response to worldwide 
exclusion, economic and social hardships, Revivalism has been the driving force behind 
present attempts to re-institute the Shari’ah.(43) However, no matter the countervailing 
position, removing Revivalist complaints will not drive out a need to understand them. In 
general, the Revivalist considers solely political solutions as inept and rather replaces them 
with Islamic solutions. Empirically however, most political solutions are unable to remedy the 
municipal legal stranglehold among Revivalists against the more typical wealthy and 
moderate ruling class. Many Revivalists argue that as Muslim nation-states emerge in the 
modern era, governments should have no role to play in the development of the judiciary. 
Revivalists argue that judicial matters should be left solely to religion without formal training 
or certification except in the Shari’ah. Calls for a renewed Islamic legal system has gained 
resonance in many states where Western and Soviet legal systems, prompted by widespread 
revivalism, are in the process of being dissolved in favor of a complete reversion to a 
disseminated Islamic legal system, (Note Appendix I).(44) Revivalists, in an attempt to 
recapture the Islamic umma of the Prophet Muhammad, believe that the only true 
revitalization of Islamic world will be through the reinstitution of the (antiquated) Shari’ah: 
For the vast majority of Muslims, the resurgence of Islam is a reassertion of cultural 
identity, formal religious observance, family values, and morality. The establishment of an 
Islamic society is seen as requiring a personal and social transformation that is a prerequisite 
for true Islamic government. Effective change is to come from below through a gradual social 
transformation brought about by implementation of Islamic law. 
On the other hand, a significant minority views the societies and governments in Muslim 
countries as hopelessly corrupt. They believe that un-Islamic societies and their leaders are 
no better than infidels and that the religious establishment has been co-opted by the 
government. Such critics believe that both established political and religious elites must be 
overthrown and a new Islamically committed leadership chosen and Islamic law imposed. 
These radical revolutionary groups, though relatively small in membership, have proved 
effective in political agitation, disruption, and assassination.(45) 
Revivalists see the present discontent as a choice: Muslims will either fully engage in their 
societies or fully dismiss their religious roots. For Revivalists, the Shari’ah is a proven system, 
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ready with an implicit religious legitimacy and authority to re-establish the link enjoined by 
the Prophet and his earliest followers. 
The immediate response to religious revivalism has been the further exclusion of Muslims 
from the West. Even assuming that present Revivalist movements are fragmented and their 
motives disparate, empirically, as the revivalist movement grows, it has increased cultural 
tensions. Most notably Western Europe has instituted a precarious counter response by 
establishing social barriers and an uncompromising political backlash against Muslim 
immigrants and enabling right-wing parties to gain ascendancy.(46) 
 
The Reformist Response 
Despite the rhetoric, Revivalists and Reformists seek the same ends, however, few 
Reformists have found the means to alter the prevalent mode of moderate thinking under 
such economic and social duress. 
The intellectuals, the liberal-minded [of] the Islamic world are so apologetic and defensive; 
they concede to the fundamentalists more than what the fundamentalists are asking for 
themselves. Most of all, they concede to the fundamentalists the legitimacy and the right and 
the ability to define the issues and to define the space of discourse. That is something that we 
have to question among ourselves. We are not simply dealing with someone who holds a 
counterview, but we are dealing with our own internal defeat, which gives that counterview 
more weight than it deserves. One of the issues that one finds in discussing questions of 
cultural specificity or relativism and religious fundamentalism is the fear that by engaging in a 
cultural or religious discourse you are conceding the platform, you are conceding the terms of 
reference to the other side.(47) 
Islamic nations are under enormous pressure to restore Islamically based governments 
while at the same time empower their populations economically. In the end, the great 
challenge for Islam will be to emerge in the twenty-first century as it did one thousand years 
ago: a respected center of a socially advanced culture and a center of international trade. The 
dilemma posed before the Reformists is to either “adopt the culture of the West, and lose 
one’s culture and thus one’s self, or renounce the culture of the West and lose one’s role in the 
modern world.”(48) Such a dilemma is an oversimplification because implicitly any significant 
changes to the Islamic world must be religiously valid. As Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, 
renowned Islamic scholar, points out as a recurrent theme, “If we are to understand anything 
at all about what has happened in the past and is happening today in the Muslim world, we 
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must appreciate the universality and centrality of religion as a factor in the lives of the Muslim 
peoples.”(49) 
In response to the outright cynicism of liberal Muslims who argue for a complete recession 
of the Shari’ah, there exists a broad historical basis for legal change in Islam. Early Islam 
displayed a great deal of legal ingenuity and freedom as expressed in the formulation of 
the ijtihad.(50) With the end of rationalism, Qur’anic injunctions were interpreted in a strict 
fashion. However, insisting on the same rubric of thought (as the Revivalists argue) 
maintained centuries ago without an evolving sense of how to reflect the modern world 
defeats the purposes of the Qur’an. Ultimately, the message of Islam when relegated to a 
particular place and time becomes useless. Although religious law has played a powerful role 
in the affairs of humanity, in the case of Islam, it has been used to maintain the status quo. 
Stated simply, “The literal interpretation of the Shari’ah over the past few centuries which 
continues almost unabated in present Muslim countries, has done the greatest harm to 
Muslims.”(51) 
The Shari’ah was more than quasi-injunctions; rather it was sum of philosophies, now 
dulled by a lack of purposeful engagement of Muslim scholars and too revered or ingrained to 
be altered by progressive Western legal intuitions. Reformists see Islam as a progressive faith, 
not one so entrenched in antiquated laws that it fails to convene with modern expectations. In 
recalling the discussion about the usul al fiqh’s development, the Reformist, for future 
discussion on the Shari’ah, must conclude the essential fact that Islamic law is fabricated, and 
not God willed: 
Islamic countries have a deeply rooted tradition in religious and secular law as the co-
existing force. Although the force itself is rooted in the region’s most sacred texts, the Qur’an, 
the majority of Islamic law is man-made not God made. Further, it is adaptable and 
changing.(52) 
Accepting the major premise that the Shari’ah is a malleable legal system, there needs to be 
a proper course for change. One major criticism of the Shari’ah and attempts at its re-
institution lies with the misuse and inability for everyday Muslims to question or revise 
the usul al fiqh. Reformists in proposing (what Revivalists term radical) innovative changes to 
the Shari’ah must balance the apparent difficulty of rejecting earlier held beliefs presently 
functioning in downtrodden societies clamoring for change. Noticeably absent from the 
debate is the role of democracy. Most Muslims remain silenced by a general lack of education 
combined with a religious reverence for the Shari’ah even when such religious precepts seem 
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at odds with the very nature of the Qur’an and Islam. Stated another way, when most Muslim 
populations know of only one book and believe that book to be the Word of God, it is difficult 
to ignore municipal calls for religious idealism in the midst of social turmoil. By summarily 
dismissing a domestic impetus to alter the law, Muslims should see the present system of 
international law as a venue to articulate changes to municipal governance. Instead of posing 
as the West’s antithesis, Islamic states have an opportunity of using international law to 
dissolve archaic paradigms in order to promote a new religious setting so that Muslims can 
begin to implement legal innovations within municipal Islamic law in order to ameliorate 
present social and economic turmoil. 
 
Islam and International Law 
The Islamic debate between Reformist and Revivalist now focuses on the emerging field of 
international law as a supranational legal corpus not entirely restrained by individualistic 
municipal laws. International law stands to witness what may be a valuable time: forcing a 
reformation of the Shari’ah by engaging Islamically sovereign nations with distinct, yet 
intertwined, approaches to implement broad-based changes in the municipal Shari’ah. 
However, such a revitalization and reformation of the Shari’ah must not come at the expense 
of divorcing Islam from Islamic states, but a revival of legal principles en masse. At the onset, 
there is two very separate hurdles that the Reformist must accept: first, the Shari’ah is ill 
suited to the modern world and will continue to doom Islamic states without fundamental 
reforms and second, that the Reformist argument for integration of international law into 
Islam has only begun and requires further solidity. We have already seen the failings of the 
present system; we now turn out attention to the development of an Islamic international law. 
Accepting the premise that the Shari’ah has little chance of reformation through purely 
popular movements when deprived of full-fledged democracy requires Reformists to seek an 
alternative venue of jurisprudence.(53) of well-developed institutions national and cultural 
sovereignty combined with a coefficient for creating broad-based legal principles, the 
international legal arena becomes a vital forum for the Shari’ah’s enunciation. Recall that 
present attempts to reform the Shari’ah look much like the initial development of the Divine 
Law: formulated during the genesis of the Schools of Law that were culturally varied and 
geographically distant. An international Islamic legal discourse would flow through similar 
channels of international dealings and by transcending national boundaries reach the same 
revolutionary result as the scholastic stage of the Shari’ah’s development. 
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There are two conceptualizations of Islamic international law (as siyar); one paradigm 
deals with the time before the modern nation state and the other following the emergence of 
the nation state.(54) Despite secular and theoretical notions, the standard view of Islamic 
international law is at first glance, contradictory to present international legal norms. For 
some, there simply isno basis for Islamic international law. Hasan Moinuddin, conducting a 
study of international Islamic organizations, states that Islamic international law is no more 
than a common juridical background. His connotation suggests a minimalist international 
view further consigning the Shari’ah as simply an independent common language of Islamic 
nations.(55) This premise ignores not only the evolution of Islam since its imperial period, but 
goes so far as to assume that the fictional dar al islam (world of belief) is truly segregated 
from the rest of the world. The scholarly conclusion that there is no comprehensive Islamic 
international law, however, is not a historical accident, but rather the inability to 
accommodate (by Muslims and Westerners alike) an evolving Shari’ah within the constructs 
of present international law.(56) 
Early Islamic internationalism tied itself to a religious distinction rather than defined 
political distinctions. Early Muslim thinkers and present Revivalists divide the world between 
distinct polarities: one of belief (dar al islam) the world of peace and (dar al harb) the world at 
war, delineating between believers and non-believers.(57) However, the forced dichotomy 
between religious believers and non-believers has been completely altered by historical and 
religious reality. To break this religious impasse, Reformists and everyday Muslims need only 
articulate a Qur’anic axiom: there is no textual premise for the dar al harb/dar al 
Islam divide.(58) Theoretically, this bifurcation of belief began because of religious hostilities 
surrounding the Prophetic mission in Medina. Recall our terse examination of history: during 
Islam’s early years in Medina, the religion was under the onslaught of rival faiths requiring a 
reluctant militancy to repel adversarial forces. However, before this bellicose era, --during 
Islam’s rise in Mecca, Muslims were commanded to engage peaceable relations and focus 
especially on their personal religious development. When the Prophet Muhammad died in 
632, the collective religo-political umma for which the Revivalist clamors died with the 
Prophet. Even under the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the political dimensions of 
the umma changed. The subsequent Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties were actual contenders, 
not allies. In essence, the People of the Faith could no more reconcile Islam with themselves 
let alone act as a unified force against other faiths. Once Muslims accept that they are unable 
to incorporate the whole of humanity into Islam (which is already evident in the Qur’an) then 
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the dar al harb/dar al islam distinction makes little sense.(59) Consequently, the “idyllic” 
Islam of Medina no longer functions in the modern world. Unfortunately, the hostile divide 
between Islam and the West remains to be reversed. 
The modern international paradigm is defined by historical hostilities between Western 
nations and Islamic states. Because Islamic legal scholars believe that the true definition of 
internationalism is confined to the operation of war and peace, Islamic international law still 
operates on a jus ad bellum standard.(60) Subsequently, Islamic international law is ill defined 
and ill suited for the modern world. “The siyar (pre-nation-state paradigm) cannot be said to 
be compatible with the modern international jurisprudence with respect to treaty principles, 
customary law, precedent or even the teachings of eminent publicists.”(61) Specifically, to 
alter the jus ad bellum approach, Reformists must tackle the issue of jihad (the Muslim concept 
of war). Today, jihad is a readily abused term in the West, and like the more amorphous terms 
in the Qur’an, Muslim fanatics also abuse it.(62) Safely stated a valid jihad is a historical and 
religious rarity. Instead, jihad became a catchall to describe any kind of controversy between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Recall, from history, that the notion of jihad in the Meccan suras of 
the Qur’an first existed as a “spiritual exertion” while the Medinan suras point to a literal 
“war” against Islam’s enemies.(63) 
After the European development of the modern nation-state, the rest of the world began to 
establish the first notions of international law. To fully comprehend the Islamic mindset of 
exclusion from international law requires only a perusal of political history: the European 
genesis of creating standards among imperial powers, deliberately excluded their Muslim 
counterparts. Typically, the expansion of the modern international regime has been at the 
expense of declining Muslim powers. In the past, European expansion to the East came with 
mixed interludes with the exotic Muslim world and the colonial period that followed helped to 
harbor major mistrust between Muslims and the West. 
What remains of the residual effects of colonialism is Islam’s increased assertive role in the 
world and attempts to foist a competing ideology. When a Muslim writes of international law, 
they write in response to established Western norms and where the West is usually 
disinterested to the Islamic response, Muslims take a defensive or an almost regressive 
stance: an “apologetic preoccupation” rather than a proactive stance.(64) David Westbrook, 
one of few scholars who have put forth a study of the siyar, concludes that in international 
law, “Islam needs to account for, respond to, explain, or make useless. For the Islamic scholar, 
public international law is foreign. As a consequence, the authority of public international law 
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over Muslims, its legal quality, is inherently problematic.”(65) The Islamic road to 
internationalism is distinct from the (Western) historical rhetoric because of its emergence as 
a political andeconomic response to the West, only intensified by present failures of Islamic 
social institutions. 
As a matter of establishing political statehood, the Islamic umma was doomed to division 
after the Prophet’s death. Since the time of the Prophet, the umma presupposed a monist view 
of the world, but history points to a diametrical reality. “From the tenth century onwards, the 
fission of the Islamic ‘nation’ continued as an increasing number of secular rulers competed 
for power. By 1258, the Mongols sacked Baghdad and brought an end the last of Abbasid 
caliphate, thereby shattering the last vestiges of the unitary (Sunni) Islamic theocracy.”(66) 
Formally, conceptual Muslim nation states stabilized with the complete abolition of the 
Ottoman caliphate in the early 20th century and the establishment of secular Turkey.(67) 
However, the more powerful impetus for broader Islamic engagement has been the social 
and political stagnation in the post-Cold War era. Muslims living in the post-colonial arena are 
either too young, not particularly homogeneous with regard to lingual differences, 
incorporated in various states, and/or lacked any strong motive to engage in nationalism. The 
political, social, and economic stagnation of the present Islamic world has forced many 
Muslims to gather under a disparate Revivalist movement in order to create a national and/or 
cultural identity.(68) However, the post-Cold War world offers Islamic nations a new level of 
external security coalesced with a greater assertion of Islamic identity. 
Accepting the premise that Islam did not grow under the traditional history of modern 
nation states, combined with the fact that the “fundamental” law is man-made and is alterable, 
the formal, legal, and political recognition of varied interests, state divisions may do much to 
persuasively develop a consistent and moderate view of the Shari’ah. Islam as a civilization 
flourished at its highest levels of engagement with other civilizations. Nation states once 
formalized by distinct borders, help segregate a people’s function. Unlike past empires there is 
no need to harmonize (or brutalize) particular popular distinctions. As states function in the 
modern international framework, they supply independent consent based upon their own 
interpretation of religious law. Today, Islam dominates more than fifty national 
populations.(69) The infancy of modern international law further invites Islamic states to 
adhere to universal principles by producing forum among equal states to push the Shari’ah 
into the modern era, but by its own terms and by its own momentum to reach a new 
progressive framework. Consequently, the division of the umma among state equals and fuller 
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integration of Islamic states in the international legal arena has already pushed the 
progressive development of municipal Islamic law. 
Although scholars such as Westbrook point to a lack of established international law, they 
fail to recognize that Islamic law is inherently international.(70) The Shari’ah occupies a 
superlative point in the legal arena of many nations (see Appendix I) such that it functions 
much like a modern international framework. Within this framework, one finds resonant 
concepts of jus cogens and preemptory norms found within the Qur’an and the Shari’ah. At 
present, the core international principles and legal groundwork has been laid: 
Muslim states have accommodated themselves to the prevailing international norms while 
stopping short of assimilating them into Islamic political or legal theory. In other words, 
although they have committed themselves to the principles of international law, there has yet 
to occur a theoretical incorporation of these principles into a coherent and modern 
elaboration of Islamic international law. (71) 
A growing international Islamic awareness to international norms has already begun. The 
formulation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the concomitant 
formulation of the Islamic International Law Commission has drawn some attention. These 
homegrown solutions have not produced the results anticipated. As Appendix II 
demonstrates, the distinction between the dar al harb and dar al islam remains as long as 
political leaders insist on a rubric of cooperation rather than full integration in the 
international community. 
The Organization of Islamic Conference charter does concede two important international 
distinctions. First, the State parties to the Charter recognize the legitimacy of international 
boundaries, implicitly recognizing the concept of the modern nation state which helps further 
erode the dar al islam/dar al harb distinction. Second, despite the trivialities deduced from 
respective municipal laws, the Charter’s close resemblance to Western notions of the nation-
state are another indication that Islamic willingness and capability, arguendo, to participate in 
the wider scope of international dealings. Despite present definitional shortcomings, it is 
difficult to call Islamic law anything but an international law. After appreciating the 
theoretical notions of the siyar, those things Islamic and those things international have much 
in common. One litmus test of international legal compatibility is found in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
ICJ Article 38 argues that the sources of law for international legal considerations shall 
apply in the following situations: 
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International conventions whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
International custom, as evidence if a general practice accepted as law; 
The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
Subject to provisions of Article 59, judicial provisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the 
rules of law. (72) 
One constant in the international legal process is the notion of pacta sunt servanda (the 
obligation that the treaty’s obligations be fulfilled). Concomitantly, a Muslim is obliged to 
uphold contracts in both letter and spirit as detailed in the Qur’an itself. “The principle 
of pacta sunt servanda is recognized by all Muslim jurist-theologians.”(73) The Shari’ah 
maintains that full faith be placed in the observance of all bona fide contracts. Following in the 
Christian conviction of Grotius, Islamic international law draws its authority from God. Thus, 
religious compliance with a treaty eclipses temporary “state” arrangements of mutual 
convenience. Consequently, there is a stronger moral force for self-proclaimed Islamic states 
to adhere to treaty obligations even if the underlying substantive law proves less than 
celestial. More important, proof of bona fide and purely Islamic efforts to uphold an 
international treaty is found in the standard set forth in the Treaty of Hudaybiya.(74) The 
treaty between the Prophet Muhammad and the idolatrous tribes of Mecca was aimed at 
achieving a truce between the warring sides. Even after repeated breaches by the Meccans, 
Muhammad’s entry by force into Mecca came without incident. Instead, the Prophet 
Muhammad granted general amnesty to all of the non-believers. The treaty offers two 
important points of consideration: the treaty, at that time, was in fact an international treaty 
of peace between Muslims and some of the more aggressive tribes of Arabia, and although a 
military reprisal was justified under the terms set forth in the treaty, an extreme counter-
response never materialized. (75) 
The Shari’ah has always accepted the powerful role of custom in framing legal standards. 
Custom, like treaty obligations is central to the practice of international law. One need only 
examine the Islamic reliance on the custom of the Prophet (hadith) to realize like the Islamic 
faith, withholding custom would impair the entire structure of thought. Like the role of 
custom in international law, the hadith helps fill gaps in international law. Considering both 
the letter and the policy provisions articulated in Article 38 of the ICJ statute, and their 
importance in expounding the Qur’an, custom and peremptory norms of nation function in 
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much the same way as articulated in the Vienna Convention on Treaties, (Art. 53 & 64). Even 
the distinction between jus cogens as a more historical and “natural” law and customary law 
as a common conventional law, finds a mirror image in the history replicated in the hadith and 
the conventions endorsed by the Qur’an under the Shari’ah. 
General principles among civilized nations of the world in Art. 38(c) resonates within the 
Shari’ah.(76) Recognition of basic principles has always empowered states to clarify and 
distinguish the law and legal systems in order to arrive at a fair global synthesis. Although 
some Muslims note the word civilized is laden with European presumption, the present world 
community accepts the (nebulous) Islamic legal tradition and ergo collective Islamic 
responses. However, states being vigilant in demanding a clarification to what the general 
Islamic view should be will only help to define what such Islamic legal views are for 
themselves and others. Because of a desire for Islamically initiated and adjudicated results, 
Reformist attempts to change municipal legal systems require a responsive Muslim 
articulation in the international arena to push the Islamic corpus forward. 
Khadduri, as one of the few experts on Islamic international law, demonstrates how 
international paradigms based on consensus is much like the ijma’ become binding. This 
binding force will help to articulate principles in municipal Islamic law.(77) A new era of 
international law will follow when the theology in place finally rejects the dar al islam/dar al 
harb distinction and accepts the empirical positions of the Reformists. For Islamic 
international law to continue, it must defeat the Revivalist attempts to masquerade social 
reforms that are inconsistent with religious Islam. Reforms of the municipal Shari’ah require 
that Islamic international law must take aim at certain considerations. First, international 
decrees must consider all relevant socioeconomic conditions before the application of any 
binding general principles. Any articulation of the Qur’an must stand firm without being 
compromised by either hadith or an obscure lingual context requiring that principles be 
drawn only from purely Qur’anic textual references. Second, the application of religious law 
must look at the flow of the Qur’an in its entirely. Although at first glance this contention 
seems identical to the previous principle, it actually forces scholars to square the flowing of 
concepts of the entire legal corpus, not just the rigidity of choice phrases. Third, a new 
international paradigm must be expansionary and malleable in order to bring forth new legal 
doctrines reflecting future exigencies. Although the process set forth, is admittedly vague, 
there is a fourth addition of a further catalyst: full-fledged institution of democracy. By 
accepting the accurate premise that the Shari’ah is almost entirely artificial, a complete 
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revolution must consider popular demands and assent to all-encompassing restrictions. As a 
result, Reformists must place a premium in pushing for educational reform so that legitimate 
democracy can take over the process. Until there is a point of self-sufficient democracy, there 
is an important role for international law to play in forcing an evolution of the Shari’ah. 
 
Women, Islam and International Law 
International law has played a significant role in altering the Islamic municipal landscape in 
the area of women’s rights. A major point of contention between Islamic custom and modern 
international expectations is the role of women’s rights in Islam.(78) Women’s rights have 
constantly attracted the attention of the West, Revivalists, and Reformers alike. Modern 
international laws have illustrated disparities between the domestic rights of women in 
Islamic states and the tenancy for Islamic states to mask not only their international, but their 
domestic failings in upholding women’s rights. In particular, as the processional of the treaties 
has continued, albeit a noticeable waxing and waning of municipal support, Islamic states 
have altered many of their municipal laws in response to international obligation paralleled 
by domestic Islamic support. In particular, several international legal obligations, instigated 
by treaty bodies have not only produced ephemeral results, but also a permanent domestic 
impact. Illustrating such progress has been the growth of women’s political rights under the 
United Nations Declaration on Women and other freedoms established in the Convention for 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). However, Islamic 
states have signaled their unwillingness to compromise religious belief for an adherence to 
international norms articulated in the Platform for Action at the 1995 Beijing Conference on 
Women. 
Despite Revivalist calls to ignore “Western cultural rights,” Islamic nations have not only 
begun to respond to the influences of international treaties, but have begun, in earnest, to 
create an evolved set of Islamic principles in the form of the Cairo Declaration of Human 
Rights in Islam. However, Reformists, rightly, have not been conciliating by anything less than 
complete international integration. Worse, Revivalist forces threaten to remove progresses in 
women’s rights in the name of upholding religion. Thus, the international community has an 
obligation to force Islamic nations to conform not only with internationally acceptable norms, 
but allow the proliferation of norms within the Shari’ah to permeate in their municipal legal 
arenas. Acknowledging that Shari’ah development has been tainted by the ossification of time 
combined with a strenuous Revivalists push to impose more strict rules, the debate is 
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discomfiting at best. Nevertheless, failing to implement established standards of international 
law will only encourage a continuation of the abuses of an antiquated Shari’ah. 
At present, there can be little rationale for the deplorable treatment of women under the 
Shari’ah. The irony is that Islam in the 7th century was the most progressive religion in the 
Near East, which included provisions including the banning female infanticide, granting 
women the right to inherent land, to divorce and to maintain their own pay/dowries, and the 
slow end to polygamy in the Arabian Peninsula. 
[The Qur’an] replaced, modified, or supplemented earlier tribal laws. Practices such as 
female infanticide, exploitation of the poor, usury, murder, false contracts, fornication, 
adultery, and theft were condemned. In other cases, Arab customs were gradually replaced by 
Islamic standards. Much of the Qur’an’s reforms consist of regulations or moral guidance that 
limit or redefine rather than prohibit or replace existing practices. Slavery and women’s 
status are two striking examples.(79) 
Yet, much of the progressive spirit of Islam died with the Prophet’s death in 632. Instead 
many jurists, despite full knowledge that the Qur’an had allotted women rights and 
responsibilities to bringing them on par with men, suddenly stopped. For the vast majority of 
religious scholars, where the Qur’an gave no more, they gave no further. However, Reformists 
correctly point to the Qur’an’s implicit gradualism as a justification for the historical 
liberalization of women in early Islamic Arabia, but acts as a template for present reforms: 
As the name suggests, gradualism is a method of interpretation that proceeds by degrees, 
over time, advancing slowly but regularly. Gradualism is ideally suited to Islam because, while 
the Qur’an does enumerate certain legal standards, it consists primarily of very broad and 
general moral directives. (80) 
Renewed attention from the international community and subsequent refusal by 
Reformists and Western nations to accept blanket reservations to treaty obligations because 
of an adherence to the nebulous Shari’ah has forced a moderating Islamic response. Although 
the responsibility lies with Reformists within Islamic nations to present a domestic counter 
argument, there comes the concomitant responsibility of Western and international legal 
scholars to accept the permanency of Islam within states and reject, for the time being, a 
complete dissolution of the Shari’ah because removing Islam from people’s lives will only 
intensify Islamic revivalism. Forcing moderation to their point that it no longer conforms with 
culture and society will only invite a greater and repressive counterrevolution as in the case 
of Iran in 1970’s.(81) 
III Jornadas de Medio Oriente | Departamento de Medio Oriente 
Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales | Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales (UNLP) | 2000 
 
24 
 
Revivalists, who have invoked notions of Islamic exclusivity, have been inflamed by 
increased world attention and scrutiny. Present Revivalist movements have pushed the need 
to adhere to the Shari’ah in both public and private matters. For many Muslims the way out of 
one’s own economic struggle is to make God present and dismiss all other earthly concerns. 
The reality, however, is that ruling political groups have used the banner of Islam to mask 
their own desire to retain some semblance of power. Ann Mayer, in her thorough study of 
human rights and Islam, believes the Shari’ah masks underlying women’s rights concerns, 
warning that continued delay in the adherence of international standards will invite increased 
hostility between Islamic states and international sensibilities.(82) Instead, as she adeptly 
points out, the machination of Islamic law is more the long arm of politics rather than the true 
disposition of Islam. 
Although Revivalists have used the Shari’ah as a tactical weapon against women’s rights, 
Reformists have also used it against itself through progressive religious reinterpretations. 
Deeply entrenched abuses against women such as the nefarious practice of genital mutilation, 
long asserted as an Islamic principle, has never had the implicit or explicit support of the 
Shari’ah or the Qur’an. Like genital mutilation, older institutional laws have been defeated by 
an expressio unius est exclusio alterius test using the Qur’an as the emphatic document of 
choice to the exclusion of the sunna. This test allows policy makers to affect legal changes until 
purely domestic Islamic movements can assure change. As the law stands now, failures of 
municipal law have come under the scrutiny of increased international pressure. 
One particular area where a religious pretext was brought to the forefront of international 
attention was the 1967 United Nations Declaration on Women followed by the more popular 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The 
Women’s Convention has been described as the “definitive international legal instrument 
requiring respect for the observance of the human rights of women.”(83) The Convention’s 
ambitious agenda gained widespread popularity: “The Convention provides the basis for 
realizing equality between women and men through ensuring women's equal access to, and 
equal opportunities in, political and public life -including the right to vote and to stand for 
election- as well as education, health and employment.  States parties agree to take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation and temporary special measures, so that women 
can enjoy all their human rights and fundamental freedoms.”(84) Adopted in 1979 and 
entered into force in 1981, the Convention seeks to eradicate the harassment against women 
and to promote equality among the sexes in their social and legal rights. Unlike past 
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considerations about the legal status of international agreements, Muslim nations paid very 
close attention to the development of women’s rights because of the Convention’s widespread 
popularity in all parts of Islamic society. In particular, certain Islamic reservations to the 
treaty obligations garnered a full-fledged rebuke by the international community. In 
particular, Article XVI of the Treaty enjoining states to end prejudicial and customary forms of 
discrimination drew initial Islamic hostility.(85) 
The Islamic response to international calls for the withdrawal of such overbroad 
reservations was mixed. Despite a wide disparity of religious opinion, some Islamic countries 
(Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco) registered reservations to Article XVI of the Women’s 
Convention predicated on the Shari’ah.(86) These Islamic states’ thinly veiled attempts to 
block criticism for their own internal practices by demonstrating an adherence to the Shari’ah 
came under intense scrutiny when such overbroad reservations contradicted the object and 
purpose of the Convention. The Vienna Convention defines a reservation as “a unilateral 
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing [or] ratifying . . . a 
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty in their application to that State.”(87) Under Article 19(a) and (b) of the Vienna 
Convention, a country can make reservations to a treaty at the time of signing or ratifying it so 
long as the treaty does not prohibit formulation of reservations or limit types of reservations 
that may be made. Mere compliance with these two subsections, however, does not 
automatically render a reservation valid. Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention prohibits 
reservations incompatible with a treaty’s object and purpose.(88) 
The international response to the Islamic states was especially harsh. For the first time, a 
community of nations summarily refused to accept the reservations as a matter of internal 
social concerns to Islamic states.(89) For the Reformist and most of the global community, it 
was difficult to accept a reservation that devised by an obscure standard as excuse to block 
international law. Today, with the fifty-year anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights passed and the end of the Cold War, simple acquiescence to reservations is no 
longer an acceptable practice. The international debate requires that Islamic states provide a 
clear and legitimate response to the challenges posed by the Convention. 
Although the reservations increased global hostility to the Shari’ah reservations, such 
worldwide hostility further incensed Revivalists. Luckily, a multitude of nations quickly 
attacked the Revivalist concerns about the “unfair intrusiveness” of the international 
community arguing that upholding international standards was not a question of cultural 
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relativism: international agreements aim for higher standards.(90) Despite the criticism of 
Islamic reservations, the debate did emphasize the growing international status of Islamic 
states. The Convention’s deliberations took place among equals in a general debate about 
tradition and theology. The hope remains that increased implementation of parallel laws will 
follow on a municipal level once scholars empirically and theologically dismiss weak and 
overbroad Islamic legal excuses. 
Because of early intransigence, at the outset only five Islamic states had adopted the treaty 
by 1981.(91) By 1994, twelve Islamic states had ratified the Treaty. Importantly, no Islamic 
nations filed a reservation to Article VII and Article VIII dealing with political equality among 
the sexes.(92) Even more remarkable, Tunisia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have implemented 
laws following in the Convention’s path. 
Buoyed by treaty and popular support, Tunisia began to implement a series of women’s 
rights modifications cleverly using previously dismissed religious doctrine to justify 
municipal legal changes. Due to a strong, but uncertain Reformist movement, Tunisia 
produced redefined Qur’anic principles in order to adhere to broader Convention provisions. 
By 1981, Tunisia gave divorced women the right to a level of maintenance to which she was 
accustomed while married, a debt that continues until the husband’s death or until the former 
wife’s economic condition improves.(93) In 1992, stepping from the harsh and intransigent 
policy that women could not divorce men despite abuse or deprivation, Tunisia modified 
divorce so that it cannot be pronounced until after a family magistrate has attempted to 
reconcile the spouses. If there are minor children, at least three reconciliation hearings must 
be held, no less than 30 days apart between each. During divorce proceedings, family 
magistrates are empowered to issue orders, where urgent, regarding spousal residences, 
alimony, custody of children and visitation rights.(94) In addition, Tunisia has already 
legalized abortion for years and provides free abortions when performed in public facilities 
and uncovered by medical insurance.(95) Tunisia’s re-interpretation of Islamic law according 
to the Hanafi view, permitted abortions before the soul was formed deemed to be up to four 
months after conception.(96) By 1993, the Tunisian government vowed to endow women 
with new rights, including the suppression of domestic violence.(97) 
Some states, taking their cue from the Treaty language, not only controverted basic 
Shari’ah, but also directly controverted a well-established hadith. The Convention furthers 
women’s political rights in Art VII & VIII by laying down provisions ensuring that women not 
only have the right to vote, but also the right to stand for election in all publicly elected bodies 
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and to hold public office in any area concerned with the public and political life of the country. 
In addition, the right to represent government in the international sphere is specifically 
provided for in Article VIII.(98) Although no Islamic states entered a reservation, there is an 
obvious conflict between Shari’ah and treaty provisions. 
The main source of prejudice in Shari’ah against women entering the political sphere, 
emanates from a hadith recorded by Abu Bakr (the Prophet’s closest friend) who claims when 
the Prophet Muhammad was told of a woman leader being appointed in Persia, he 
commented, “A nation will never prosper if it is led by a woman.” (99) Islamic states 
summarily rejected the inequitable interpretation of the Shari’ah, by essentially abolishing 
the hadith! Specially, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have extended specific guarantees the 
franchise to women in politics, with Bangladesh having women retain a certain number of 
seats in its parliament. In particular, Bangladesh and Pakistan have had women at the highest 
levels of political leadership.(100) 
The Convention allowed policymakers and international legal scholars to bring attention to 
women’s rights concerns. In response to pressure from the West and the half-century 
celebration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the nations of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference produced the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights of Islam in 1990 
proving to be an unequivocal of example of Islamic international collectivism since the time of 
the Prophet. The Declaration’s merits, nevertheless, has been criticized as shortsighted. 
However, the Declaration represents two significant representations of Islamic 
internationalism. First, the entire Organization of Islamic Conference formulated the 
Declaration (Appendix I). Second, it is a uniquely Islamic response. 
The Cairo Declaration assumes more general significance than the previous Islamic human 
rights schemes because it embodies an approach to rights that has been endorsed by the 
foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).(101) 
An evaluation of the following articles has been deeply criticized as a failure to uphold 
women’s rights including the robust criticism of the eminent scholar Ann Elizabeth 
Mayer.(102) However the criticism, the Declarations hybridization of Islamic and 
international standards should be seen a positive indication of Islamic attempts to define their 
own legal legacy. 
At the outset of the Declaration, international standards are invoked: “[R]eaffirming their 
commitment to the UN Charter and fundamental Human Rights, the purposes and principles 
of which provide the basis for fruitful co-operation amongst all people.”(103) In addition, one 
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of the Declaration’s critics, Mayer concedes the significance of the Islamic declaration as a 
blending of Islamic and modern international principle representing a departure from the 
canons of the Shari’ah: 
Like other Islamic human rights schemes, the Cairo Declaration is actually a hybrid of 
international and Islamic elements. It does not have an exact counterpart in the Islamic legal 
legacy. Like the preceding Islamic human rights schemes, the Cairo Declaration, in formulating 
its civil and political rights, borrows extensively from terms and concepts taken from the 
International Bill of Human Rights and combines them with elements inspired by Islamic law 
or the authors’ conceptions of Islamic values (emphasis added). (104) 
Specifically, Article 1 of the Declaration states “human beings” (the neutral term of al 
bashar in the Arabic version) are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations 
and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, 
religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations.” (105) Although 
there is great ambiguity in the phraseology used, the article represents a forthright effort to 
stay the course of treating women as equals with expansionary language allowing for state 
departures to institute their more progressive policies than those outlined in the declaration. 
Article 2 states “[E]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” (106) The 
main criticism is the fact that the word “entitled” is not a guarantee and the words “such as” 
may act as either limitation or an expansionary clause. In addition, Article 5 provides that on 
the right to marry there should be “no restrictions stemming from race, color or nationality,” 
but does not prohibit restrictions based upon religion. Although the Declaration does not 
guarantee the freedom to marry the partner of one’s choice, there is a presumptive 
permission within the Qur’an.(107) The Declaration regretfully accommodates yet another 
artificial ban labeled “Islamic.” Specifically, Muslim women may not marry outside the faith, as 
well as the rule that Muslim men may marry only Muslims, Christians, and Jews. As with many 
Islamic human rights provisions, the discriminatory potential of Article 5 will only be 
apparent to scholars familiar enough with the principles of Islamic law to appreciate the 
significance of the failure to incorporate a right to marry regardless of religion. (108) 
However Article 6 further worries Reformists, “a woman has rights to enjoy as well 
as duties to perform,” which implies that notions of equality have been quietly subverted since 
the document states few further rights.(109) Three rights are enumerated, ones that are 
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enjoyed by women even under conservative interpretations of Islamic law: (1) the right to 
enjoy legal personality; (2) the right to own and manage her property; and (3) the “right to 
retain her name and lineage.”(110) 
The same article also requires women to care for the family and for the husband. A male’s 
duty is to provide maintenance, (nafaqa).(111) The husband’s duty to support the wife 
correlates with the husband’s legal prerogative vis-à-vis the wife, including his right to 
demand obedience.(112) In imposing one-sided support obligations, the Cairo Declaration 
effectively calls for the perpetuation of the traditional pattern of inequality in the husband-
wife relationship in which the husband is the master and provider.(113) Article 12 also is 
worrisome since it further restricts women’s rights. It begins: “Every man shall have the right, 
within the framework of the Shari’ah, to free movement...”(114) This reference to the Shari’ah 
as a framework opens the door to further restrictions on women’s movements. Such 
restrictions viewed in light of strict Islamic law, effectively states that wives cannot leave 
home without their husbands’ permission and women cannot travel unless chaperoned by 
male relatives. 
Finally, Article 13 promises that work is “a right guaranteed by the State and Society for 
each person able to work.”(115) The article also provides that men and women are entitled to 
fair wages “without discrimination.” The Article makes an important departure from previous 
allocations that women simply take a subservient role. Instead, Article 13, in its broadest 
reading may allow ways to undercut readings set forth in Article 6. Women as Mayer points 
out, under the Cairo Declaration and even to a point under CEDAW, do not enjoy complete 
equality. There is an implicit Islamic duty under current international treaties and 
conventions recognized in religion and in law to protect women from persecution.(116) 
Furthermore, the international legal regime has an additional duty to ensure that Islamic 
states utilize the Shari’ah as means to effectively allow women the same rights entrusted to 
men. 
Although feminists and scholars point out that the Declaration does not go far enough, it 
does represents a step in the right direction. The language in the Declaration is thought to be 
the basic rights enjoined by men and women in Muslim states that allows for a more 
expansionary reading. For the first time, Islamic states were forced to articulate a response 
because of increasing demands that Islam evolve. The Declaration forced states to consider 
their blanket and overbroad reservations to CEDAW, and account for individual practices 
formulated on the basis for Islamic consensus. Clearly, the declaration’s approval does not 
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excuse Islamic nations from pursuing the continued promotion of equality. Therein lies the 
admonition that Reformists and other nations must help preserve Islamic principle without 
compromising on international norms. In fact, Islamic states, taking their cue from the 
Qur’anic example, are encouraged to be more religiously expansive. 
Women have fundamental freedoms within Islam, and all the goals of equality espoused by 
the West can be achieved by applying the notion of gradualism inherent in the religion. Thus, 
the best way to solve this problem may not lie in dictating from the outside what standards 
must be met by the culture, but rather in encouraging a liberalization of the interpretation of 
the religion by Islamic scholars themselves.(117) 
The Islamic engagement produced three important distinctions: first, a common 
responsiveness must be generated when Islamic states begin to consider entry into major 
treaties covenants involving human rights or other erga omnes standards. Second, use of 
broad reservations using the Shari’ah should be avoided altogether. Third, by providing for a 
general awareness and a predisposition not to block international treaties, it allows Muslim 
states to create domestic laws which execute treaty obligations in a free and concerted way. 
A distinction from this line of thinking came in the form of the 1995 Beijing Conference on 
Women forcing Islamic states to assert Islamic law, however this situation signaled a 
validation of personal religious practice. The United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing was one of the latest attempts to determine whether there are 
internationally accepted women’s rights.(118) The Conference ended with all attending states 
approving the adoption of the Conference’s final document, the Platform for Action and 
Beijing Declaration.(119) Although the objectives stated in the Platform are not binding legal 
obligations of the participating states, the Platform serves as a guideline for the development 
of women’s human rights, especially focusing on the economic and social empowerment of 
women.(120) 
It identified twelve critical areas of concern for women: (1) women and poverty; (2) 
education and training of women; (3) women and health; (4) violence against women; (5) 
women and armed conflict; (6) women and the economy; (7) women in power and decision-
making; (8) institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women; (9) the human rights of 
women; (10) women and the media; (11) women and the environment; and (12) issues 
surrounding the female child. Thus, the topics that the Platform covered were varied, 
including educational, health, and economic issues.(121) 
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However, the fight fought in Beijing was concerning Art. 96’s maintenance of women’s 
reproductive freedoms. Again, like previous conventions and platforms, Islamic states united 
in their opposition to the Platform for Action and filed a purely religious reservation.(122) 
“Because of their importance and intransigence, objections based in religious beliefs pose a 
substantial hurdle to the ultimate development of a proposed rule into international 
law.”(123) Although the Shari’ah of the 10th century, however, made no rule condemning early 
abortions, many Islamic states objected to the matter on religious grounds as an act of 
murder.(124) Many national delegations, save the United States, did not voice dissent to the 
religious contention. The Islamic front was more a testament to religious faith as evidenced by 
concurring reservations put forth by the Vatican and heavily populated Catholic states. 
In fact, there is scant proof that the majority of Islamic states will alter their view of 
abortion as a purely religious principle: 
In the religious world of the three great monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam that dominate much of the world today, unrestricted abortion could never amount to an 
international human right. To assert such a thing implies a universalism of abortion as a 
necessary good that does not, and has never, existed, other than in the feminist 
imagination.(125) 
The Islamic dissent in Beijing represents a reminder to the international community: the 
religion of the Prophet Muhammad will remain. Islam will not turn itself to the West’s 
religious faith constituting: “a harsh mixture of classicism, impiety, and science washed down 
with a heavy dose of the belief that ‘free will’ equals intelligence and religious belief indicates 
stupidity and superstition.”(126) Islamic states are distinctive actors but they 
remain religious states perhaps more theocratic than democratic where the Word of God has 
retained its vitality. Within the borders of these states, Muslims may live their lives faithfully, 
as Islam embraces every aspect of their daily being. It is this aspect of Islam--its all-
pervasiveness--that alarms some in the West. The international community and especially 
Western actors must accept the vitality of religion as a greater supranational force. 
 
Conclusion 
Today’s Muslims, living in the shadow of the Prophet, are the heirs to an astounding 
religious and political legacy. Many live in a difficult time where their social and political 
institutions offer little or no true Islamic identity and little in terms of material wealth. In fact, 
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the disillusionment of many Muslims has led to the growth of a burgeoning Revivalist 
movement. 
The Revivalists are attempting to invoke a religious solution fourteen centuries in the past 
to solve once again the problems of everyday people. The problem is that process and the 
antiquity of such a solution may do more harm than good. By instituting Islamic law, it seeks 
to legitimate failed human attempts at discerning God’s reason and apply it to everyday life. In 
the past, struggle to discover Divine morality led to a premature legal exhaustion that still 
affects the present state of law. 
On the opposite side of the religious spectrum, Reformists identifying Islam as a 
progressive faith attempt to meet modern expectations of faith by sidestepping the poor, 
uneducated, and tyrannical and seeking international aid to remedy ossified Islamic law. As 
Reformists seek to demolish the old law by restoring a principled international discussion 
aimed at a sweeping revision to earlier held religious concepts, the Revivalist beckons the 
illiterate to follow their path to salvation. However, the age of disconcerted empires has ended 
and, like it or not, Islamic nation-states have evolved in a state of flux and historical animosity. 
The post-Cold War world will be defined by how civilizations interact, but more important, 
the stasis following decades of intense hostility have given Islamic states renewed identity as 
equal members in the family of nations. This time, according to the Reformist, is a unique 
opportunity to end mistrust among religions and put forth substantive solutions to common 
concerns. For the zealot Revivalist, this is a time of anticipation and fear. The Cold War’s end 
has left Islamic states susceptible to the machinations of the international legal system. 
International law stands to witness what may be a defining moment in Islamic 
international law at stake is municipal change and the path is treacherous yet promising. The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and her 
progeny has given a prime example of how the current flux of Islamic law depends on the 
vigilance of the present international system. With regard to Islamic law, nothing is written, 
and truly, nothing is written unless they write it. 
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